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1. Introduction
In consumption analysis, the role of aggregation over individuals has been a subject of
much interest (Blundell and Stoker 2005, Chiappori and Ekeland 2011, Gorman, 1953,
1961, Jorgenson et al. 1980, 1982, Muellbauer 1975). These studies treat households as
individuals by implicitly assuming an egalitarian distribution that equates the levels of
well-being among family members. But there is strong evidence that the levels of well-
being can differ among family members (Browning and Chiappori 1998, Browning et al.
2014, Chiappori 1988, 1992). In collective household theory, knowledge about individual
welfare entails a family welfare function that relates the set of potentially unequal levels
of well-being for family members to an aggregate measure for the family as a whole (Sen
1984, p. 378). This “mini social choice problem,” as Sen terms it, involves understand-
ing the linkages among individual behavior, household demand, and the aggregation of
unequal well-being. However, the relationships between individual and household wel-
fare are complex and remain imperfectly understood. This suggests a need for a refined
analysis of the linkages between individual demand behavior and household welfare.
The composition of this missing piece of aggregation theory is our major contribution.
In the tradition of collective household models, the efficient allocation of resources
within a household is captured by a Bergsonian household utility function involving dif-
ferent welfare weights applied to each individual. Maximizing this Bergsonian utility
function subject to a household budget constraint generates centralized household de-
mands that, in a Pareto efficient household, give the same demands obtainable from a
decentralized household program. By examining the relationship between centralized
and decentralized demands for private goods within a household economy, we show
that income shares are equal to the product of two weights: the Pareto weight and a dis-
tribution weight reflecting income effects across individuals. We also show how these
weights play a role in the evaluation of both household welfare and intra-household
inequality for a specific class of indirect utilities.
Chiappori and Meghir (2015) contend that developments in collective theory should
extend the analysis to the treatment of public goods and household production and to
the measurement of intra-household inequality. Our investigation characterizes how
the distribution of resources within the household impacts inequality. While our ap-
proach focuses on private consumption goods, note that our results could accommo-
date public goods and household technologies with minimal adjustments.1 Our analysis
exploits Chiappori and Meghir’s (2015) key remark assertion that the sharing rule con-
tains all the information required to implement the measurement of intra-household
inequality because it is possible to construct a general inequality index as a function of
individual incomes. Our novel contribution shows that for a weighted Bergsonian rep-
resentation of household utility and general assumptions about individual preferences,
the inequality index takes the form of a family of entropy indexes.
We illustrate our findings with an empirical application that estimates a collective
demand system to recover associated individual and household welfare functions along
1In a household production context involving public goods, our analysis would still apply reliance on
shadow prices of utility-yielding goods, prices that can differ among individuals due to individual differ-
ences in the household production process.
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with the measures of intra-household inequality. This is the first application that esti-
mates the Pareto weight and examines its role within a measure of income dispersion
across household members.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets notation and introduces the ba-
sic model of collective consumption. Section 3 describes the role played by individual
preferences and associated welfare and distribution weights for different household wel-
fare functions of empirical interest, and derives measures of inequality describing intra-
household distribution of resources in a formal way. Section 4 empirically illustrates the
theory developed in the paper. Section 5 concludes.
2. The collective model of household consumption
Consider a household composed of K individuals involved in the consumption of goods.
The kth individual consumes a bundle of nk goods xk = (xk1     xknk) ∈ Rnk with
associated prices pk = (pk1    pknk) ∈ Rnk++, k = 1    K. Let x = (x1    xK) and
p = (p1    pK). In our conceptual framework, the vector of market prices p is given.
The consumer goods xk are specific to the kth household member with prices pk,
k = 1    K. This includes the case where some goods are private and assigned to a
given household member (e.g., male clothing versus female clothing in a two-person
household). This also includes the case of time allocation where the labor of each
household member faces a different wage rate. Finally, this covers the case where the
household is involved in production activities, using a bundle of goods z = (z1     zm)
to produce the consumer goods x= (x1    xK). The goods in z can be private goods or
public goods, purchased by the household at prices q= (q1     qm) ∈Rm++. The house-
hold production technology is represented by the feasible set F , where (xz) ∈ F means
that goods x can be obtained when z is purchased (Barten 1964, Browning and Chiap-
pori 1998, Browning et al. 2013, Chavas 1989, Ferreira and Perali 1992, Lewbel 1985,
Perali 2003). The household production technology can model either the production
of “commodities” from which agents derive utility Becker (1965), or the marketable pro-
duction of farm households (Squire et al. 1986), or the production of quality (Gorman
1980, Lancaster 1966). Assume that the production technology exhibits constant re-
turn to scale (CRS). Under efficiency, the household purchases goods z to produce con-
sumer goods x so as to minimize expenditure E(x) = min z{∑mi=1 qi · zi : (xz) ∈ F}. Let
pk = ∂E/∂xk denote the shadow price of xk, k = 1    K. Under CRS, E(x) is a linear
homogenous function of x and can be written (at least locally) as E(x) =∑Kk=1 pk · xk,
yielding the household budget constraint
∑K
k=1 pk · xk = y, where pk · xk denotes the in-
ner product of the two vectors pk and xk, and y ∈ R++ is household income. Note that,
in this case, the shadow prices pk can differ across individuals because of differences in
the production process of goods xk from z, k= 1    K.
The kth household member has preferences over xk represented by a nonsatiated
and quasi-concave utility function uk: Rnk → R, k = 1    K. The household utility
function is defined as U(u1(x1)     uK(xK);p y), where U is a strictly increasing func-
tion of (u1     uK) that aggregates individual preferences into household preferences
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and reflects distribution issues within the household.2 As discussed in the Introduction,
our analysis focuses on the household allocation of market goods privately consumed
by family members. Consumption of private goods can be either assigned or nonas-
signed to a specific member of the household. The family decision process is conducted
in a deterministic environment and leads to Pareto-efficient outcomes provided that
individual utility functions are well behaved (Menon et al. 2016).
The utility function U(u1     uK;p y) is a generalization of the Samuelson welfare
function and represents household preferences across individuals,3 and may reflect the
relative bargaining power of individuals within the household. Throughout the paper,
we assume that uk(xk) is a strongly monotone and strictly quasi-concave function of xk.
The household faces a linear budget constraint
∑K
k=1 pk · xk = y.
Efficient allocations within the household are derived from
V (p y)= max
x1xK
{
U
(
u1(x1)     uK(xK);p y
) : K∑
k=1
pkxk = y
}
 (1)
where V (p y) is the household indirect utility function. The optimal choices are the
household centralized demands xC(p y)= (xC1 (p y)    xCK(p y)).
Consider a situation where the household income y is allocated among the K house-
hold members and where the kth individual receives the monetary amount φk ∈ R++
subject to the household income constraint y =∑Kk=1φk. The efficient household allo-
cation in (1) can then be decomposed into two stages as
V (p y)= max
φ1φK
{
max
x1xK
{
U
(
u1(x1)     uK(xK);p y
) : pkxk =φk} : K∑
k=1
φk = y
}
 (2)
Because the household preference function U(u1     uK;p y) is strictly increasing
in each individual utility uk, (2) can be written equivalently as
V (p y) = max
φ1φK
{
U
(
V1(p1φ1)     VK(pKφK);p y
) : K∑
k=1
φk = y
}
 (3)
Vk(pkφk) = maxxk
{
uk(xk) : pkxk =φk
} ∀k= 1    K (4)
where Vk(pkφk) is the indirect utility function for the kth individual, conditional on
prices pk and on the income allocation. Equation (3) describes the optimal income allo-
cation among all household members with solution denoted by (φ1(p y)    φK(p y)),
2One can accept that household preferences for the distribution of resources depend on prices and in-
come because they define the values of outside options of household members or because they can be a
measure of member’s contribution to the formation of household economic resources. Note that price-
and income-dependent utility functions entail that the usual results of consumption theory, in particular
Slutsky symmetry, will no longer hold true. For an interesting discussion of the specification of a household
welfare function with prices and income, see Apps and Rees (2009).
3Household preferences can also be affected by the sociodemographic characteristics of each household
member (Barten 1964, Blackorby and Donaldson 1991, Lewbel 1999, 2004, Perali 2003), but we choose not
to include them to simplify the notation. While we do not explore the direct role of sociodemographic
effects in the present context, we allow for heterogeneity of preferences among household members.
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where the income allocated to the kth individual is φk(p y), which depends on all prices
p and on household income y. Below, we assume that U(u1     uK;p y) is differen-
tiable in (u1     uK) and that (3) has an interior solution with φk(p y) > 0, k= 1    K.
Equation (4) defines the decentralized Marshallian demand for the kth individual, with
solution denoted by xDk (pkφk) that depends on (pkφk). Under household efficiency,
the optimal income allocation to the kth individual satisfies φk(p y) = pkxCk (p y), and
the maximization problem in (1) is equivalent to (3) and (4).
A household decides to allocate income y among its K members as described in
(3). As expected, this allocation is related to the household’s preference ordering for the
utility of its members.
Proposition 1. Under differentiability of the household utility function U(u1(x1)    
uK(xK);py) and at the optimum, an efficient household allocation for the kth member
satisfies
λ(p y)
λk(pkφk)
= ∂U(u1     uK;p y)
∂uk
 (5)
where λ(p y) and λk(pkφk) are the optimizing value of the Lagrange multipliers of the
household and individual budget constraints, respectively.
Proof. Consider the constrained maximization problem in (3). The associated La-
grangian is L = U(V1(p1φ1)     V K(pKφK);p y) + λ[y − ∑Kk=1φk], where λ is the
Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint y = ∑Kk=1φk. The first-order necessary
condition for an interior solution with respect to φk is
∂L/∂φk = 0 ⇒
[
∂U(V1     VK;p y)/∂Vk
][
∂Vk(pkφk)/∂φk
]− λ= 0 (6)
Under household efficiency, note that (4) implies that Vk(pkφk) = uk(xDk (pkφk)),
and at the optimum, applying the envelope theorem to (4) gives ∂Vk(pkφk)/∂φk =
λk(pkφk). Combining these results with (6) yields
λ(p y)
λk(pkφk)
= ∂U(u1     uK;p y)
∂uk

which gives (5). 
3. Household welfare evaluation and intra-household inequality
There has been much interest in linking welfare at the individual level with the aggre-
gate level Gorman (1953), Muellbauer (1975). This section analyzes the issue in the
context of the household, with a focus on the evaluation and measurement of house-
hold welfare. While the household utility function U(u1     uK;p y) reflects prefer-
ences with respect to distribution within the household, it does not make such prefer-
ences explicit. As shown below, in general, the sharing rule identifies the role played by
∂U(u1     uK;p y)/∂uk as a welfare weight. This corresponds to the intuition of close
relationships between welfare weights and income distribution within the household.
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To analyze distribution issues, it is convenient to focus on a specific representation
of the household utility function. In this regard, consider the weighted Bergsonian spec-
ification in the tradition of the collective household literature
U(u1     uK;p y)=
K∑
k=1
μk(p y)uk(xk) (7)
where μk(p y) ∈ (01) is a welfare weight4 reflecting the relative contribution of the kth
individual to household welfare. This can be a function of market prices, income, and
distribution factors, that is, exogenous variables that affect the Pareto welfare weight
but do not affect either individual preferences or the budget constraint. In the theoreti-
cal sections, we omit the distribution factor notation for convenience. Further, without
loss of generality, these welfare weights are normalized to satisfy μk(p y) ∈ (01) and∑K
k=1μk(p y)= 1. From Proposition 1, specification (7) gives the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Under (7), for all k= 1    K, (5) reduces to
λ(p y)
λk(pkφk)
= μk(p y) (8)
Equation (8) explicitly shows the relationships between the welfare weights μ =
(μ1    μK) and the Lagrange multipliers. When 0< μk < 1, it follows that λ < λk. For
the kth member, the value of one extra unit of income when living with her/his family
is worth less than in the situation where she/he has control over her/his own income.
As shown below, (8) provides useful insights into the economic and welfare analysis of
household behavior. Note that expression (8) is the cardinal representation of the or-
dinal object (5) presented in Proposition 1. The reader may refer to Proposition 2 in
Browning et al. (2013) to find an alternative way to derive the Pareto weight. Further,
from (8) it follows that
μk(p y)/μr(p y)= λr(pr φr)/λk(pkφk)
for all k r = 1    K, k = r. In a way consistent with Browning et al. (2013), this states
that, under household efficiency, the relative welfare weights μk(p y)/μr(p y) are equal
to the relative decentralized marginal utilities λr(prφr)/λk(pkφk).
For any given economic situation (p y), the Bergsonian specification (7) can ap-
ply to general household preferences U(u1     uK;p y) as long as ∂U(u1     uK;p y)/
∂uk = μk(p y), which means that, conditional on given (p y), it is valid to ana-
lyze the behavioral and welfare implications of alternative Bergsonian welfare weights
(μ1    μK). This proves particularly convenient for our analysis: the presence of ex-
plicit welfare weights (μ1    μK) in (7) can shed useful light on their role in consump-
tion decisions and the welfare analysis of distribution issues within the household. We
use this property extensively in this section.
4The weight μk can be interpreted as the Lagrange multiplier of the Pareto optimal problem where agent
k maximizes her/his own utility while ensuring that the utility of agents r is greater than or equal to a
predetermined utility level.
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But what happens when economic conditions (p y) change? Then, under house-
hold efficiency, V (p y) would change and so would ∂U(u1     uK;p y)/∂uk. In this
context, the Bergsonian utility function (7) would remain valid under general house-
hold preferences U(u1     uK;p y) but only on the condition that we allow the wel-
fare weights (μ1    μK) to adjust to changing economic conditions. In other words,
the Bergsonian approach would continue to hold provided that the welfare weights
(μ1    μK) are treated as endogenous to satisfy μk(p y) = ∂U(u1     uK;p y)/∂uk at
the optimum for all (p y). To simplify the notation, the analysis presented below treats
the dependency of the welfare weights (μ1    μK) on (p y) as implicit.
The income sharing rule φk/y, that is, the proportion of household income allo-
cated to the kth individual, has a specific correspondence with the Bergsonian welfare
weights.
Proposition 2. Under the Bergsonian representation of household preferences (7), (3)
implies the income sharing rule for the kth individual,
φk
y
= μk(p y)wk (9)
where wk = [∂Vk(pkφk)/∂ ln(φk)]/[∂V (p y)/∂ ln(y)] is a weight satisfying
K∑
k=1
μk(p y)wk = 1
Proof. Let y > 0 and φk > 0. For a given μk, the relationship in (5) can be alternatively
written as [∂V (p y)/∂ ln(y)][1/y] = [∂U(u1     uK;p y)/∂uk][∂Vk(pkφk)/∂ ln(φk)]×
[1/φk]. This gives (9). 
The relationship in (9) shows that the proportion of household income φk/y re-
ceived by the kth individual is equal to the product of two weights: the welfare weight
μk(p y) and the distribution weight wk, capturing marginal effects of intra-household
income distribution. For the kth individual, wk is the ratio between the marginal
individual utility due to a change in individual income ∂Vk(pkφk)/∂ ln(φk) and the
marginal household utility due to a change in household income ∂V (p y)/∂ ln(y) for
a given μk.5 This can also be interpreted as an elasticity describing how the curvature
of the indirect utility function of the household changes as the distribution of income
varies across household members (Menon et al. 2016). The result (9) extends the exist-
ing literature by showing how the Pareto weight μk relates to the income sharing rule
φk/y. It identifies the role played by the distribution weight wk. As shown below, this
structure reveals fundamental relationships in the measurement of intra-household in-
equality that could not have been characterized otherwise.
We now investigate the welfare implications of these general results by examining in
detail how household welfare varies with the distribution of income within the house-
hold. We also examine the linkages between individual preferences and income sharing
5As shown by Browning and Chiappori (1998), the dual representation of the collective program is con-
ditional on a given level of household utility and Pareto weights.
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rules under alternative individual preferences. We start the analysis with the indirect
utility specification for the kth individual,
Vk(pkφk)= fk
(
gk(φkpk)
Bk(pk)+Ck(pk)gk(φkpk)
)
 (10)
where fk is a strictly increasing function, and the functions Bk(pk), Ck(pk) and
gk(φkpk) are chosen so that Vk(pkφk) is homogeneous of degree 0 in (φkpk).
The utility specification (10) is very flexible and includes as special cases many mod-
els commonly found in the literature. Following Lewbel (1989b, 1990, 1991, 1995),
the preference specification (10) belongs to the class of rank-3 demand systems that
can exhibit nonlinear Engel curves. For example, when gk(φkpk) = φk − Ak(pk),
(10) gives the quadratic expenditure system (QES) proposed by Howard et al. (1979),
where demands are quadratic functions of income.6 Alternatively, when gk(φkpk) =
ln(φk)− ln(Ak(pk)), (10) gives the quadratic almost ideal demand system (QAIDS) pro-
posed by Banks et al. (1997) where budget shares are quadratic functions of the loga-
rithm of income.
The general implications of individual preferences (10) are now presented.
Proposition 3. Under the Bergsonian household utility (7) and individual preferences
(10), the household welfare is
V (p y)=
K∑
k=1
μkfk
(
gk(μkwkypk)
Bk(pk)+Ck(pk)gk(μkwkypk)
)
 (11)
Proof. We start with the relationship V (p y) =∑Kk=1μkVk(φkpk). Using (9) and (10)
gives (11). 
The income sharing rule (9) and the indirect household utility function (11) apply
under fairly general conditions. As further discussed below, the specification (10) allows
for nonlinear Engel curves. This means that the income sharing rule (9) and the house-
hold utility function (11) apply in the presence of nonlinear income effects that can vary
across individuals. Below, we investigate in more detail the implications of varying as-
sumptions about the functions fk and gk as summarized in the synoptic Table 1. Note
that cases a and c in the table refer to Section 3.1, whereas cases b and d refer to Sec-
tion 3.2. The last subsection discusses measures of intra-household inequality.
3.1 Translated sharing rule
Consider the specification where gk(φkpk) = φk −Ak(pk) in (10), which corresponds
to the QES preference representation (Howard et al. 1979). The indirect utility function
for the kth individual takes the form
Vk(pkφk)= fk
(
φk −Ak(pk)
Bk(pk)+Ck(pk)
(
φk −Ak(pk)
)) (12)
6Another specification of preferences is the trans-log utility function (Christensen et al. 1975, Jorgenson
et al. 1982, Lewbel 1989a).
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fk(ζ) gk(φkpk) Income Sharing Rule Household Welfare
ζ a. φk −Ak(pk) (i) Ck = 0 φk−Ak(pk)y−A(p) = μkWk y−A(p)P∗(pyμ)
(ii) Ck = 0 φk−Ak(pk)y−A(p) = μk y−A(p)P∗0 (pyμ)
(iii) Ck = 0 and Ak = 0 φky = μk yP∗0 (pyμ)
b. ln(φk/Ak(pk)) (i) Ck = 0 φky = μkwk
∑
k
μk
ln(y)+ln(μkwk)−ln(Ak(pk))
P˜k(pkyμk)
(ii) Ck = 0 φky = μkwk
∑
k
μk
ln(y)+ln(μkwk)−ln(Ak(pk))
Bk(pk)
(iii) Ck = 0 and Ak = 1 φky = μkwk
∑
k
μk
ln(y)+ln(μkwk)
Bk(pk)
ln(ζ) c. φk −Ak(pk) (i) Ck = 0 φk−Ak(pk)y−A(p) = μkW0k ln( y−A(p)P(pyμ) )
(ii) Ck = 0 φk−Ak(pk)y−A(p) = μk ln( y−A(p)P0(pyμ) )
(iii) Ck = 0 and Ak = 0 φky = μk ln( yP0(pyμ) )
d. ln(φk/Ak(pk)) (i) Ck = 0 φky = μkwk
∑
k
μk ln[ ln(y)+ln(μkwk)−ln(Ak(pk))P˜k(pkyμk) ]
(ii) Ck = 0 φky = μkwk
∑
k
μk ln[ ln(y)+ln(μkwk)−ln(Ak(pk))Bk(pk) ]
(iii) Ck = 0 and Ak = 1 φky = μkwk
∑
k
μk ln[ ln(y)+ln(μkwk)Bk(pk) ]
Table 1. A synoptic table of the sharing rules and household welfare specifications. Individual
indirect utility function Vk(pkφk)= fk( gk(φkpk)Bk(pk)+Ck(pk)gk(φkpk) ).
where fk is a strictly increasing function, the functions Ak(pk) and Bk(pk) are homo-
geneous of degree 1 in pk, the function Ck(pk) is homogeneous of degree 0 in pk, and
specification (12) allows for flexible price effects (e.g., when Ak(pk) is specified to be a
quadratic function of pk). Throughout, we assume that φk−Ak(pk) > 0. In this context,
φk −Ak(pk) is a measure of “translated income,” where Ak(pk) is a price function that
can be interpreted as a committed level of subsistence income for the kth individual.
Using Roy’s identity, the decentralized demand for xki associated with QES preferences
(12) is
xDki =
∂Ak(pk)
∂pki
+ ∂
(
Bk(pk)
)
∂pki
[
φk −Ak(pk)
]+ ∂Ck(pk)
∂pki
1
Bk(pk)
[
φk −Ak(pk)
]2

Note that QES preferences (12) include as special cases quasi-homothetic preferences
when Ck = 0. Under quasi-homothetic preferences, individual Engel curves are linear
because ∂xDki/∂φk is independent of φk (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980a, 1980b, Gorman
Gorman (1961)). In turn, QES preferences (12) include as special cases homothetic pref-
erences when Ck = 0 and Ak = 0. In this case, all Engel curves are linear and go through
the origin. This indicates that QES preferences (12) offer some flexibility in capturing in-
come effects, including nonlinear Engel curves when ∂Ck/∂pk = 0. As such, they provide
a good basis on which to evaluate the linkages between individual welfare and house-
hold welfare.
The implications of individual preferences (12) for income sharing and household
welfare are presented next.
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Proposition 4. Under the Bergsonian household utility (7) and individual preferences
(12), the income sharing rule satisfies
φk −Ak(pk)
y −A(p) = μkWk k= 1    K (13)
and household welfare is given by
V (p y)=
K∑
k=1
μkfk
(
μkWk
y −A(p)
Pk(p yμk)
)
 (14)
where A(p) = ∑Kk=1Ak(pk), Wk = [∂Vk(pkφk)/∂ ln(φk − Ak(pk))]/[∂V (p y)/
∂ ln(y − A(p))] is a weight satisfying ∑Kk=1μkWk = 1, and Pk(p yμk) = Bk(pk) +
Ck(pk)μkWk(y −A(p)), k= 1    K.
Proof. Starting from the relationship V (p y) =∑Kk=1μkVk(φkpk) and using (12), we
have
V (p y)=
K∑
k=1
μkfk
[(
φk −Ak(pk)
)
/
(
Bk(pk)+Ck(pk)
(
φk −Ak(pk)
))]
 (15)
Let A(p) =∑Kk=1Ak(pk). Under the Bergsonian household utility (7), (9) can alterna-
tively be written as
φk −Ak(pk)
y −A(p) = μk
(
∂Vk(pkφk)
∂ ln(φk −Ak(pk)
)/( ∂V (p y)
∂ ln
(
y −A(p))
)
= μkWk (16)
where Wk = [∂Vk(pkφk)/∂ ln(φk − Ak(pk))]/[∂V (p y)/∂ ln(y − A(p))] is a weight sat-
isfying
∑K
k=1μkWk = 1. This gives (13). Substituting (13) into (15) gives the desired re-
sult. 
Proposition 4 applies for any increasing function fk in (12) and (14). The sharing rule
in (13) states that the proportion of “translated income” received by the kth individual
[φk −Ak(pk)/y −A(p)] is equal to the product of two weights: the Bergsonian welfare
weight μk and the weight Wk that reflects income effects under optimal income distri-
bution within the household. This can be important when marginal income effects are
observed to vary with income levels. In this context, the term Wk in (13) captures the
effects of preference heterogeneity across individuals within the household. This term
also enters the household utility (14). This raises the following question: Are there sit-
uations where these heterogeneity effects vanish? In other words, are there scenarios
where Wk = 1 in (13) and (14)? Our analysis identifies such conditions below.
In a first step, we examine the special case where fk(ζ)= ln(ζ) in (12), which is sum-
marized in panel c of Table 1.
Proposition 5. Under the Bergsonian household utility (7) and individual preferences
(12), let fk(ζ)= ln(ζ). Then the income sharing rule is
φk −Ak(pk)
y −A(p) = μkW0k k= 1    K (17)
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and the household welfare function is
V (p y)= ln
(
y −A(p)
P(p yμ)
)
 (18)
whereA(p)=∑Kk=1Ak(pk), P(p yμ) is a household price index satisfying
lnP(p yμ)=
K∑
k=1
μk ln
(
Bk(pk)+Ck(pk)μkW0k
(
y −A(p)))− K∑
k=1
μk ln(μkW0k) (19)
and
W0k =
(
1− Ck
(
φk −Ak(pk)
)
Bk(pk)+Ck(pk)
(
φk −Ak(pk)
))
/ K∑
k=1
μk
(
1− Ck
(
φk −Ak(pk)
)
Bk(pk)+Ck(pk)
(
φk −Ak(pk)
))
Proof. Under individual preferences (12), having fk(ζ) = ln(ζ) implies that ∂Vk(pk
φk)/∂ ln(φk − Ak(pk)) = 1 − [Ck(pk)(φk − Ak(pk))]/[Bk(pk) + Ck(pk)(φk − Ak(pk))].
Substituting this result into (16) gives
φk −Ak(pk)
y −A(p) = μk
(
1− Ck(pk)
(
φk −Ak(pk)
)
Bk(pk)+Ck(pk)
(
φk −Ak(pk)
))
/(∑
k
∂V (p y)
∂ ln
(
φk −Ak(pk)
))
(20)
Summing (20) over all k and using
∑K
k=1[φk − Ak(pk)] = y − A(p), we obtain∑K
k=1[∂V (p y)/∂ ln(φk − Ak(pk))] =
∑K
k=1μk[1 − [Ck(pk)(φk − Ak(pk))/(Bk(pk) +
Ck(pk)(φk − Ak(pk)))]]. Substituting this result into (13) yields (17). When fk(ζ) =
ln(ζ), it follows that (14) becomes
V (p y)=
K∑
k=1
μk ln
[
μkW0k
(
y −A(p))/(Bk(pk)+Ck(pk)μkW0k(y −A(p)))]
or, using
∑K
k=1μk = 1,
V (p y)= ln(y −A(p))+ K∑
k=1
μk ln(μkW0k)
−
K∑
k=1
μk ln
(
Bk(pk)+Ck(pk)μkW0k
(
y −A(p)))
which gives (18) and (19). 
Proposition 5 gives the income sharing rule (17) and the household indirect util-
ity function (18) when fk(ζ) = ln(ζ), allowing for departures from quasi-homothetic
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preferences. Again, the weights W0k affect both the sharing rules and the indirect
utility function, reflecting income effects under optimal income sharing. The house-
hold utility function V (p y) given in (18) is equal to ln[(y − A(p))/P(p yμ)]. It is a
monotonic transformation of the household income. Interestingly, the logarithm of the
price index of (19) involves the terms
∑K
k=1μk ln(Bk(pk) + CkμkW0k(y − A(p))) and
−∑Kk=1μk ln(μkW0k). The first term is a weighted sum of ln(Bk(pk) + CkμkW0k(y −
A(p))), which reflects the cost of living for the kth individual with μk as a weight. The
second term captures the effects of the Bergsonian welfare weights μk and income dis-
tribution weights W0k on the household price index.
While Proposition 5 allows for departures from quasi-homotheticity (when Ck = 0),
it includes as special cases situations where individual preferences exhibit quasi-
homotheticity (when Ck = 0, k = 1    K). The link with the decentralized demands
can readily be applied in this context using our results. Here, we say that individual
preferences in (12) are log-quasi-homothetic if they exhibit quasi-homotheticity with
Ck = 0 and if fk(ζ) = ln(ζ), k = 1    K. Note that Ck = 0 for all k = 1    K implies
that W0k = 1 for all k= 1    K in Proposition 5. This generates the following result.
Corollary 2. Under Bergsonian household utility (7) and individual preferences (12)
that satisfy log-quasi-homotheticity, with Ck = 0 and fk(ζ) = ln(ζ), the income sharing
rule is
φk −Ak(pk)
y −A(p) = μk (21)
and the household welfare function is
V (p y)= ln
(
y −A(p)
P0(p yμ)
)
 (22)
whereA(p)=∑Kk=1Ak(pk) and P0(p yμ) is a household price index satisfying
ln
[
P0(p yμ)
]= K∑
k=1
μk ln
(
Bk(pk)
)− K∑
k=1
μk ln(μk) (23)
Corollary 2 reports the income sharing rule (21) and the household welfare func-
tion (22) obtained when individual preferences exhibit log-quasi-homotheticity. First,
comparing (18) and (22) is instructive. It shows that the evaluation of household welfare
is similar with or without quasi-homotheticity, with one notable exception: the price
indices P in (19) and P0 in (23) differ. The price index P in (19) includes the terms in-
volving Ck, while the price index P0 obtained under quasi-homotheticity does not. This
illustrates that non-homothetic preferences (or nonlinear Engel curves) affect the eval-
uation of household welfare. Second, Corollary 2 shows that the preference heterogene-
ity weight Wk no longer plays a role under log-quasi-homotheticity (as W0k = 1 for all
k = 1    K). This establishes that under log-quasi-homotheticity, heterogeneity in in-
come effects across individuals no longer affects income sharing or household welfare.
Note that while individual Engel curves are linear under quasi-homotheticity, the results
in Corollary 2 still allow Engel curves to have different slopes across individuals.
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Under log-quasi-homotheticity, the income sharing rule (21) becomes simpler: the
proportion of household “translated income” allocated to the kth individual (φk −
Ak(pk))/(y − A(p)) is equal to the Bergsonian welfare weight μk. This is an intu-
itive result: increasing the Bergsonian welfare for an individual means a proportional
increase in her/his share of translated income. Also, under log-quasi-homotheticity,
household welfare (22) takes a simple form: it is a monotonic function of translated in-
come (y −A(p)) deflated by the household price index P0 in (23). The price index P0 in
(23) shows that the welfare weights (μ1    μK) have two effects on household welfare:
as weights on the terms involving Bk(pk) and through the term
−
K∑
k=1
μk ln(μk)
This term is the Shannon entropy index. It reflects the impacts of individual welfare
weights μk on household utility. We investigate the consequences on intra-household
inequality in Section 3.3.
Finally, when Ck = 0, note that letting Ak(pk) = 0 moves preferences of the kth in-
dividual from being quasi-homothetic (with linear Engel curves) to being homothetic
(with linear Engel curves going through the origin). In this context, we say that in-
dividual preferences in (12) are log-homothetic if they are log-quasi-homothetic with
Ck = 0 and fk(ζ) = ln(ζ) and if Ak = 0 for all k = 1    K. This gives the following re-
sult.
Corollary 3. Under the Bergsonian household utility (7) and individual preferences
(12) satisfying log-homotheticity (with Ak = 0, Ck = 0 and fk(ζ) = ln(ζ)), the income
sharing rule is
φk
y
= μk (24)
and the household utility function is
V (p y)= ln
(
y
P0(pyμ)
)

where P0(p yμ) is given in (23).
Corollary 3 shows that under log-homotheticity the income sharing rule given by
(24) becomes very simple: the proportion of household income allocated to the kth in-
dividual (φk/y) is equal to the Bergsonian welfare weight μk, k= 1    K.7
7The interested reader may observe that because of the logarithmic transformation, Euler’s theorem spe-
cializes to h = xk1 (∂uk/∂x1)+ xk2 (∂uk/∂x2), where h is the degree of homogeneity. From equating the first-
order conditions of the centralized and decentralized model, h is equal to φkλk. Using λ/μk = λk and the
centralized Lagrange multiplier, λ= h/y , it follows that φk = μky . This derivation shows how the Lagrange
multipliers are associated with the sharing rules for log-homothetic preferences.
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We now present a simple example that illustrates the results presented in Corollary 3.
Example 1. Consider the case where k = 12 and i = 12 under individual Cobb–
Douglas utility functions ln(u1) = α1 ln(x11) + α2 ln(x12) and ln(u2) = β1 ln(x21) +
β2 ln(x22), with α1 + α2 = β1 + β2 = 1. This is a case of log-homothetic individual pref-
erences (as presented in Corollary 3). The associated collective household welfare func-
tion is U = μ1(α1 ln(x11)+ α2 ln(x12)) + μ2(β1 ln(x21)+ β2 ln(x22)). From the necessary
conditions, the centralized and decentralized demands are, respectively,⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
xC1i = αiμ1y/p1i
xC2i = βiμ2y/p2i
λ= 1/y
and
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
xD1i = αiφ1/p1i
xD2i = βiφ2/p2i
λk = 1/φk
Application of the second theorem of welfare economics shows that xCki = xDki, yielding
φk = μky. With log-homothetic individual preferences, the level of individual income
φk is equal to the product of household income y and the Bergsonian welfare weight μk.
In the log-homothetic case, the distribution weights wk equal 1, because the linearity of
individual and household Engel curves presupposes expenditure proportionality and, as
a consequence, the ratio between individual and household marginal utility of incomes
is indeed income independent. In fact, wk = (λk/λ)(φk/y)= (1/μk)(μk)= 1. ♦
For the sake of completeness, we examine also the translated case corresponding to
gk(φkpk)=φk−Ak(pk) and fk(ζ) equal to the identity function, summarized in panel
a of Table 1.
Proposition 6. Under Bergsonian household utility (7) and individual preferences (12)
such that fk(ζ)= ζ and gk(φkpk)=φk −Ak(pk), the income sharing rule satisfies
φk −Ak(pk)
y −A(p) = μkWk (25)
and household welfare is given by
V (p y)= y −A(p)
P∗(pyμ)
 (26)
where 1/P∗(pyμ)=∑k μk[μkWk/(Bk(pk)+Ck(pk)μkWk(y −A(p)))].
Proof. Recall that Vk(pkφk) = [(φk − Ak(pk))/(Bk(pk) + Ck(pk)(φk − Ak(pk)))].
Then using (25), we have V (p y) = ∑k μkVk = ∑k μk[μkWk(y − A(p))/(Bk(pk) +
Ck(pk)μkWk(y −A(p)))] and V (p y) = (y −A(p))
∑
k μk[μkWk/(Bk(pk)+ Ck(pk)μk ×
Wk(y −A(p)))] = (y −A(p))/P∗(pyμ). 
Note that the indirect utility function depending on 1/P∗(pyμ) = ∑k μk[μkWk/
(Bk(pk) + Ck(pk)μkWk(y − A(p)))] would be linear in income if μk is constant and
Ck = 0, giving corner solutions for the sharing rule.
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3.2 Deflated sharing rule
We now consider the specification where gk(φkpk)= ln(φk)− ln(Ak(pk)), correspond-
ing to QAIDS preferences as reported in panels b and d of Table 1.8 Following Banks
et al. (1997), under a QAIDS model for the kth individual, the indirect utility function
(10) takes the form
Vk(pkφk)= fk
(
ln(φk)− ln
(
Ak(pk)
)
Bk(pk)+Ck(pk)
(
ln(φk)− ln
(
Ak(pk)
))) (27)
where fk is a strictly increasing function, the functions ln(Ak(pk)) and Bk(pk) are each
homogeneous of degree 1 in pk, and the function Ck(pk) is homogeneous of degree 0
in pk. Note that gk(φkpk) = ln(φk) − ln(Ak(pk)) = ln(φk/Ak(pk)). In this context,
φk/Ak(pk) measures the “deflated income” and Ak(pk) is a price function that can be
interpreted as the weight that scales the individual income. The budget share associated
with xki under the QAIDS model (27) is
pkix
D
ki
φk
= ∂ ln
(
Ak(pk)
)
∂ ln(pki)
+ ∂
(
Bk(pk)
)
∂ ln(pki)
(
ln(φk)− ln
(
Ak(pk)
))
+ ∂Ck(pk)
∂ ln(pki)
(
ln(φk)− ln
(
Ak(pk)
))2
Bk(pk)

(28)
The share equation (28) shows that the QAIDS specification (27) allows for flexible
price effects (e.g., when ln(Ak(pk)) is specified to be a quadratic function of ln(pk)) as
well as quadratic income effects (when ∂Ck/∂ ln(pk) = 0). Note that the QAIDS model
reduces to the almost ideal demand system (AIDS) proposed by Deaton and Muellbauer
(1980a) when Ck = 0, where AIDS budget shares are linear functions of the log of in-
come. This indicates that, like the QES specification evaluated in Section 3.1, the QAIDS
specification (27) is also a good candidate for evaluating the linkages between individual
welfare and household welfare.
The implications of QAIDS individual preferences (27) for income sharing and
household welfare are presented next.
Proposition 7. Under the Bergsonian household utility (7) and QAIDS individual pref-
erences (27), let fk(ζ)= ζ. Then the income sharing rule satisfies
φk
y
= μkwk k= 1    K (29)
8It is interesting to note that, changing notation, panels b and d give the same functional representa-
tions of household welfare as a and c, respectively. Consider the substitutions φ˜k = ln(φk) and A˜k(pk) =
lnAk(pk), with y˜ =
∑
k ln(φk) and A˜(p) =
∑
k lnAk(pk). Rewriting ln(φk/Ak(pk)) = lnφk − lnAk(pk) =
φ˜k − A˜k(pk), one obtains φ˜k/y˜ = μkw˜k, where w˜k = (∂Vk(pkφk)/∂ ln(ln(φk)))/(∂V (p y)/∂ ln(ln(y))) is
a weight satisfying
∑K
k=1μkw˜k = 1. Note that ln y =
∑
k ln(φk) is admissible if ln(φk) = (μkw˜k) ln y , and
summing over all k, one gets
∑
k ln(φk)=
∑
k μkw˜k ln y = ln y .
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and household welfare is given by
V (p y)=
K∑
k=1
μk
ln(y)+ ln(μkwk)− ln
(
Ak(pk)
)
P˜k(pk yμk)
 (30)
where wk = (∂Vk(pkφk)/∂ ln(φk))/(∂V (p y)/∂ ln(y)) is a weight satisfying
∑K
k=1μk ×
wk = 1 and P˜k(pk yμk)= Bk(pk)+Ck(pk)[ln(y)+ ln(μkwk)− ln(Ak(pk))].
Proof. Under the Bergsonian household utility (7), start with the relationship V (p y)=∑K
k=1μkVk(φkpk) and (27). When fk(ζ)= ζ, we have
V (p y)=
K∑
k=1
μk
ln(φk)− ln
(
Ak(pk)
)
Bk(pk)+Ck(pk)
(
ln(φk)− ln
(
Ak(pk)
))  (31)
Equation (29) is obtained from (9). Substituting (29) into (31) gives the desired result. 
The last case that we consider is fk(ζ)= ln(ζ).
Proposition 8. Under the Bergsonian household utility (7) and QAIDS individual pref-
erences (27), let fk(ζ) = ln(ζ). Then the income sharing rule satisfies (29) and household
welfare is given by
V (p y)=
K∑
k=1
μk ln
[
ln(y)+ ln(μkwk)− ln
(
Ak(pk)
)
P˜k(pk yμk)
]

Proof. It follows from substituting (29) in V (p y) = ∑Kk=1μkVk(pkφk), where
Vk(pkφk)= ln[(ln(φk)− ln(Ak(pk)))/(Bk(pk)+Ck(pk)(ln(φk)− ln(Ak(pk))))]. 
In this context, the distribution weight wk in (29) captures the effects of heteroge-
neous income effects across individuals within the household. This term also enters the
household utility (30).
Next, we examine the case of AIDS preferences where Ck = 0 in (27). When fk(ζ)= ζ
and from Proposition 7, (29) and (30) still apply under the AIDS model, where wk =
(1/Bk(pk))/(
∑K
k=1μk/Bk(pk)). This shows that under the AIDS specification, unless
Bk(pk) is a constant across household members, the distribution weights wk, reflect-
ing intra-household income effects, play a role and affect both the sharing rule (29) and
the household utility (30). In other words, the AIDS model (or its QAIDS generalization)
typically implies nonlinear sharing rules that depend on two sets of weights: the Bergso-
nian weights μk and the weights wk. This property holds also for the household utility
function V (p y).
3.3 Intra-household inequality
A desirable property of social evaluation functions is the possibility to express social wel-
fare in terms of an efficiency and equity component (Lambert 1993). We now show that
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the collective (indirect) household welfare function derived so far can be “abbreviated”
into an efficiency component, as if the household were in a unitary framework, which
assumes an equal distribution of resources, and an equity component, which accounts
for the dispersion in individual prices and resources across family members. The collec-
tive household welfare function is increasing in income and decreasing in the inequality
index.
For example, collective household welfare under the QES specification (22) is a
monotonic function of household income y deflated by the household price index P0
as defined in (23):
V (p y)= ln(y)− lnP0(p yμ)= ln(y)−
(
K∑
k=1
μk ln
(
Bk(pk)
)+ K∑
k=1
μk ln(μk)
)

Again, the log of price index P0 is composed of two additive terms: the weighted
sum
∑K
k=1μk ln(Bk(pk)), describing the dispersion in individual prices, and the Shan-
non entropy index
∑K
k=1μk ln(μk), capturing inequality in the distribution of house-
hold resources. Suppose that one is comparing two households with the same level
of income. Collective household welfare functions admit that the two households
may differ both in the dispersion of individual prices and in the distribution of re-
sources.
Interestingly, for each individual, this term has an inverted U-shape relationship
with μk: it first increases as μk rises from 0 to 0368, it reaches a maximum when
μk = 0368, and then decreases as μk rises between 0368 and 1. Note that, in this
case, the Shannon index is closely related to the Theil inequality index. Using (24),
the Theil T inequality index (TT ) applied to a k-member household can be written
as
TT ≡ 1
K
(
K∑
k=1
(φk/y¯) ln(φk/y¯)
)
=
K∑
k=1
μk ln(μk)+ lnK
where y¯ = y/K. The TT index measures the distance from the situation where every
member of the household attains the same resource share associated with the ideal con-
dition of maximum disorder. If all the power is concentrated in only one member, then
the index gives the value corresponding to maximum order. In this case TT = lnK, be-
cause
∑K
k=1μk ln(μk) tends to 0. Being negative, it is a measure of inequality rather
than equality. A distribution of resources skewed toward one member of the household
implies scarcity for the other members (Jorgenson et al. 1980, 1982). Interestingly, if
μk = 1/K, then TT = 0 as in the unitary model. Note also that in the unitary frame-
work, individual prices are equal to market prices and the collective indirect house-
hold welfare function degenerates into the traditional unitary indirect welfare func-
tion.
If we now consider the specification of the household indirect utility function in (26),
V (p y)= y −A(p)
P∗(pyμ)

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where the price aggregator is 1/P∗(pyμ) = ∑k[μkμkWk/(Bk(pk) + Ck(pk)μkWk(y −
A(p)))], we realize that we can no longer exploit the additive separability property car-
ried by the logarithmic transformation of z, fk(ζ) = ln(ζ). This structural feature limits
both the theoretical and empirical appeal of this representation of collective household
welfare. However, it is interesting to note that in the absence of price variation (e.g., in
cross-sectional demand analysis), letting A(p) = 0, Bk(pk) = 1 and Ck(pk) = 0 would
imply that 1/P∗(pyμ) becomes
K∑
k=1
μkμkWk
which is a weighted Simpson diversity index. In this case, household inequality would
be relatively more influenced by the members with greater weight in the family.
4. Application
For illustrative purposes, we apply our theoretical findings to a deflated model where
gk(φkpk)= ln(φk/Ak(pk)). Our analysis of household distribution issues uses observ-
able information about assignable goods as part of our identification strategy. A distinc-
tive feature of our empirical procedure is that we estimate a complete demand system,
which is a precondition for deriving both the individual and household welfare func-
tions. Knowledge of these objects is necessary to recover the Pareto weight μk and the
distribution weight wk describing intra-household inequality. A detailed description of
the empirical procedure is shown in the Appendix.
The individual indirect utility function for deflated QAIDS demand models is
Vk(pkφk)= fk((ln(φk)− ln(Ak(pk)))/(Bk(pk)+Ck(pk)(ln(φk)− ln(Ak(pk))))). By fur-
ther assuming that fk(ζ) = ζ and Ck = 0, which corresponds to the case b(ii) in Table 1,
we specialize to the AIDS indirect utilities
Vk(pkφk)=
ln(φk)− ln
(
Ak(pk)
)
Bk(pk)
 (32)
The associated household welfare function is
V (p y)=
K∑
k=1
μk
ln(y)+ ln(μkwk)− ln
(
Ak(pk)
)
Bk(pk)
(33)
and the income share is
φk
y
= μkwk (34)
where μk is the welfare weight and wk = (∂Vk(pkφk)/∂ ln(φk))/(∂V (p y)/∂ ln(y)) is the
distribution weight. Given the chosen functional form, we can express
wk =
(
1
Bk(pk)
)/( K∑
k=1
μk
Bk(pk)
)
 (35)
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Note that, in the case of two agents k = 12, the ratio of the distribution weights does
not depend on the welfare weights w1/w2 = B2/B1.9 Similarly, using this result, the
condition
∑K
k=1μkwk = 1, and (34), the ratio of the welfare weights is independent of
the distribution weights μ1/μ2 = φ1B1/φ2B2. From this expression and recalling that∑K
k=1μk = 1, the welfare weights are
μ1 = φ1B1
φ1B1 +φ2B2 and μ2 =
φ2B2
φ1B1 +φ2B2 
Substituting these expressions in the condition
∑K
k=1μkwk = 1 and using the relation-
ship that w2 =w1B1/B2, we obtain the distribution weights10
w1 = φ1B1 +φ2B2
B1y
and w2 = φ1B1 +φ2B2
B2y
 (36)
Given the welfare and distribution weights, we can evaluate the intra-household in-
equality associated with the AIDS specification. The household welfare function can
now be rewritten as
V (p y)=
K∑
k=1
μk
ln(y)− ln(Ak(pk))
Bk(pk)
+
K∑
k=1
1
Bk(pk)
(
μk ln(μkwk)
)
 (37)
where the first term is the deflated level of household income and the second term
is a measure of dispersion in individual welfare levels similar to a Theil inequality in-
dex scaled by the inverse of the price index Bk(pk). Unlike a Theil index, the distri-
bution weight wk rescales the Pareto weight μk. The measure of dispersion vanishes
in the limiting case where φk approaches y and the distribution weight approaches
1/μk. The household welfare function then reduces to the level of deflated house-
hold income. This limiting case gives the least possible weight to equity considera-
tions.
Our analysis can provide estimates of μk and wk and the measurement of the level
of intra-household inequality. This is novel in the applied collective household lit-
erature. Our empirical analysis involves estimating a collective system of AIDS bud-
get shares linear in the log of total expenditure, extending the AIDS model to ac-
count for the intra-household allocation of resources. The application uses Italian
household budget data for the year 2007 on couples without children. The data,
model, estimation technique, identification strategy, and results are reported in the Ap-
pendix.
Table 2 reports the means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum values for
the individual and household welfare levels, and the Pareto and distribution weights
along with the income shares. The level of welfare of females is higher than that of
males. Alternatively, the Pareto weights are higher for males. On average, the contri-
9Rewriting (35) as wkBk(pk)= 1/
∑K
k=1μk/Bk(pk) ∀k yields w1B1 =w2B2.
10An alternative representation of (36) is w1 = B2/(μ1B2 +μ2B1) and w2 = B1/(μ1B2 +μ2B1).
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Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Individual welfare levels
Female 5100 0662 3110 8365
Male 2888 0396 1843 4271
Household welfare levels 3688 0466 2566 5281
Pareto weight
Female 0363 0016 0307 0424
Male 0637 0016 0576 0693
Distribution weight
Female 1374 0065 1175 1644
Male 0789 0023 0715 0872
Income share
Female 0498 0005 0485 0532
Male 0502 0005 0468 0515
Table 2. Welfare levels, Pareto and distribution weights, and income share.
bution to household welfare, corresponding to the product of the Pareto weight with
the individual welfare level, is about the same for the wife and the husband. The in-
come shares are on average close to half. Judging from the distance between minimum
and maximum values, there is, however, sufficient variation informing about the intra-
household welfare and distribution of household resources. The income share is de-
composed in the Pareto and distribution weight. The distribution weights scale up the
Pareto weight of the wife and scale down the Pareto weight of the husband. The rel-
ative contribution to the household marginal valuation of money is higher for the fe-
male.
Table 3 shows the measure of intra-household inequality corresponding to the sec-
ond component of the household welfare function (37) and describing the dispersion of
individual welfare levels. This term is computed for the whole sample, and for the poor
and rich families corresponding to the lower and upper tertile of the income distribu-
tion. This index allows comparison to be made of two households with similar levels
of household income, but differing in the intra-household distribution of resources. As
shown in Table 3, the distribution of resources within less affluent Italian households is
more equitable compared to the distribution of resources in rich families and the dif-
ference between the two samples is statistically significant with a t-test equal to 1728.
This provides new and useful insights into the welfare implications of intra-household
allocations.
5. Conclusions
We model a household in terms of the utility functions of its members using a weighted
Bergsonian household utility. In a Pareto efficient household environment with pri-
vately consumed goods, we recover the relationships between centralized and de-
centralized programs where the maximization of the utility of each household mem-
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Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
All sample −0336 0028 −0434 −0244
Poor −0319 0023 −0382 −0265
Rich −0365 0024 −0434 −0284
Table 3. Intra-household inequality.
ber is subject to an income sharing rule, and we investigate the relationship among
the sharing rules, household welfare, and intra-household inequality. The linkages
established between centralized and decentralized demands provide new and use-
ful information on the economics of intra-household allocations. Our analysis de-
scribes the general properties of the income sharing rule as a function of two sets
of weights: the Bergsonian welfare weights and distribution weights reflecting in-
come effects across household members. We show that these weights play a role in
the evaluation of both household welfare and inequality. The theoretical results pro-
vide new insights into intra-household decisions and implications for the distribu-
tion of household welfare. Intra-household inequality is described by a family of en-
tropy indexes that are functions of the sharing rule. We illustrate our findings with
an empirical application that estimates a collective demand system to recover asso-
ciated individual and household welfare functions along with the measures of intra-
household inequality. This is the first application that estimates the Pareto weight
and examines its role within a measure of income dispersion across household mem-
bers. In our sample, richer couples distribute resources among their members less
equally.
Appendix. Estimation of the collective complete demand system
To derive the sharing rule, the welfare and distribution weights, and the measure of
intra-household inequality, we estimate a collective complete demand system of the
AIDS form that is linear in income. This appendix describes the household data used
in the analysis, the model specification, and estimation strategy.
Data
The data set used in this study is the 2007 Household Budget Survey of the Italian Statis-
tics Institute (ISTAT), which collects information on harmonized international classifi-
cations of expenditure items of a representative national sample of 24,400 households.
For illustration purposes, our analysis focuses on couples without children. The sample
size thus reduces to 1,407 households. Consumption expenditures are at the household
level except for a set of assignable goods, such as clothing for males and females, used
for the identification of the income share.
A limitation of the Italian household budget survey, common to many household
budget surveys, is its lack of information on the quantities consumed by each house-
hold necessary for the computation of household-specific unit values. We approximate
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unit values with a method suggested by Lewbel (1989b) and empirically developed by
Hoderlein and Mihaleva (2008) and Menon et al. (2017b). This technique captures the
spatial and quality variability typical of unit values as deduced from household socioe-
conomic characteristics. This variability is then added to the aggregate price indices
published monthly by national statistics institutes.
We estimate a complete demand system comprising budget shares for five goods:
food, housing, transportation and communications, clothing, and other goods. Goods
such as housing or transportation can be consumed either publicly or privately. In
our estimation, this is not a critical concern because we estimate budget shares ag-
gregated at the household level. Further, identification of the sharing rule relies on
the observability of assignable goods privately consumed by household members. We
acknowledge that accounting for household public goods (e.g., by estimating a con-
ditional sharing rule; see Chiappori and Meghir (2015)) would have affected the de-
mand estimates and the measures of inequality. In the estimation, we control for
geographic location (northwest, northeast, center, south Italy, and islands), working
status of spouses, seasonality effects (using a dummy equal to 1 if the family has been
interviewed in winter months), home ownership, and the number of cars owned by the
spouses. Distribution factors (i.e., exogenous variables not affecting either preferences
or the budget constraint) include the age and education ratio of the spouses. Such vari-
ables would help improve the robustness of the estimated parameters of the income
share.
Table 4 shows the definition of the variables used in the empirical analysis and the
descriptive statistics for our sample. The larger budget shares relate to other goods
(374%) and food (235%), while clothing has the smallest budget share (99%) divided
by about half between spouses. Price variability, as measured by standard deviations,
varies across goods and is substantial for all goods. It is relatively large for other goods,
housing, and clothing, while it is smaller for transportation and communications and
food. The large price variability of our data help identification of price effects: the em-
pirical results show that a large number of estimated price coefficients are statistically
significant. In regard to distribution factors, the spouses’ education levels and age are
similar, while the price of clothing is higher for female clothing than for male clothing.
The likelihood of participating in the labor market is higher for the husband (865%)
than for the wife (647%). Less than half of the sample (429%) was interviewed from Oc-
tober to February. Finally, the majority of households own the home (719%) and have
more than one car.
Demand system estimation
Our empirical analysis considers a demand system linear in the log of total expenditure
(Deaton and Muellbauer 1980a) extended to a household collective context with two
adults. Following the theory presented in Section 3.2 with Ck = 0, the kth individual’s
budget share for good i, ωDki in (28), reduces to
ωDki =
∂ ln
(
Ak(pk)
)
∂ ln(pki)
+ ∂Bk(pk)
∂ ln(pki)
[
ln(φk)− ln
(
Ak(pk)
)]

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Budget Shares Log Prices
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Food 0235 0115 1762 0350
Housing 0115 0056 0804 0377
Clothing 0099 0039 −1163 0833
Transport. & communications 0177 0093 −3337 0696
Other goods 0374 0154 0799 0809
Female clothing 0054 0031 −0725 0774
Male clothing 0044 0014 −1233 0879
Mean Std. Dev.
Distribution factors
Ageratio wife age
wife age + husband age 0486 0033
Eduratio wife education
wife education + husband education 0488 0087
Ratiop
pcf
pcm
1718 0469
Household characteristics
log(y) Log of total expenditure 7468 0501
log(yDI) Log of disposable income 7783 0399
R1 Northwest 0289 0454
R2 Northeast 0251 0434
R3 Center 0195 0396
R4 South 0180 0384
R5 Islands 0085 0279
Tj = 1 if husband works 0865 0342
Ts = 1 if wife works 0647 0478
Winter = 1 if interviewed in Oct.–Feb. 0429 0495
Landlord = 1 if owner of the house 0719 0450
No. of cars Number of cars 1478 0590
No. of observations 1,407
Table 4. Descriptive statistics.
where ln(Ak(pk)) and Bk(pk) are differentiable and concave price aggregators with the
functional form
ln
(
Ak(pk)
)= αk0 +∑
i
αki lnpki + 12
∑
i
∑
j
γkij lnpki lnpkj
and
Bk(pk)=
∏
i
p
βki
ki 
The price aggregators Ak(pk) and Bk(pk) can be interpreted as individual portions of
household subsistence and bliss costs, respectively. It is maintained that both spouses
have equal access to those costs as if they faced the same prices for nonassignable
goods.
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Food Housing Clothing Trans. & Comm. Other Goods
Intercept 0205 0482 −0277 −1205 1795
0120 0086 0043 0111 0099
Price effects
Food −0037 0040 −0013 0020 −0011
0015 0011 0008 0026 0035
Housing −0001 0016 0095 −0150
0011 0006 0021 0023
Clothing −0039 −0044 0080
0005 0009 0013
Trans. & comm. −0461 0390
0047 0039
Other goods −0309
0051
Income effects
β1 −0004 −0064 0177 0202 −0312
0023 0015 0007 0020 0020
β2 0050 −0064 −0073 0231 −0144
0022 0014 0007 0019 0020
Distribution factor effects Param S.E.
Ageratio −0010 0062
Eduratio −0061 0025
Ratiop 0015 0005
Error correction terms
Food −0152 0024
Housing 0000 0015
Clothing −0086 0007
Trans. & comm. −0325 0020
Other goods 0564 0022
Note: Standard errors are given in italics.
Table 5. Collective AIDS estimation: price, income, and distribution factor parameters.
The individual budget shares ωDki can be aggregated to obtain
ωi =ωD1i +ωD2i
= αi +
∑
j
γij lnpj +
2∑
k=1
βki
(
lnφk − lnAk(pk)
)

(53)
the budget share for each good i at the household level.
Observed heterogeneity is introduced using a translating household technology
ti(d), which modifies the demand system (53), so that demographic characteristics in-
teract additively with income in a theoretically plausible way Gorman (1976), Lewbel
(1985), Perali (2003). Thus, the demographically modified collective share equation ωi
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Food Housing Clothing Trans. & Comm. Other Goods
Northwest −0034 0023 −0017 −0002 0031
0011 0007 0002 0011 0017
Northeast −0032 0029 −0025 0007 0020
0011 0007 0002 0011 0017
Center −0019 0018 −0016 0002 0016
0011 0006 0002 0011 0017
South 0015 0001 0001 −0006 −0011
0010 0006 0002 0011 0017
Tj −0034 −0004 0003 −0025 0059
0008 0004 0001 0007 0011
Ts −0024 0003 −0001 −0009 0031
0006 0003 0001 0005 0008
Winter −0002 0003 0005 0000 −0007
0005 0003 0001 0005 0007
Landlord 0001 0006 −0006 −0010 0008
0006 0003 0001 0005 0008
No. of cars −0036 −0006 −0005 0036 0011
0005 0003 0001 0004 0006
Note: Standard errors are given in italics.
Table 6. Collective AIDS estimation: demographic effects.
in (53) becomes
ωi = αi + ti(d)+
∑
j
γji lnpj +
2∑
k=1
βki
(
lnφ∗k − lnAk(pk)
)+ εi
where εi is an error term and lnφ∗k is the log of individual income modified by a trans-
lating household technology as
lnφ∗k = lnφk −
∑
i
ti(d) lnpi
the translating demographic functions ti(d) being specified as ti(d) = ∑l τil lndl for
l = 1    L. This demand system is very similar to a traditional demand system, ex-
cept for the specification of the income term, which is expressed at individual levels
(and not the household level). Following Chavas et al. (2014), Dunbar et al. (2013),
and Menon et al. (2017a), individual incomes are derived by partitioning household
incomes with a resource share computed using the available information about the
observed expenditure on assignable goods, with nonassignable goods assumed to be
consumed in equal proportions by each household member. To obtain the sharing
rule φk, we then anchor the income scaling function mk(ψ) to individual total ex-
penditures yk, incorporating the identifying information about assignable consump-
tion as φk = mk(ψ)yk. In line with the theory results in Chavas et al. (2014) and
the empirical findings of Menon et al. (2012), mk is independent of total expendi-
ture.
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Food Housing Clothing Trans. & Comm. Other Goods
Income elasticities
Female 0981 0388 2914 2289 0094
0027 0300 0485 0572 0322
Male 1242 0389 0209 2469 0582
0356 0299 0200 0652 0148
Uncompensated price elasticities
Food −1172 0133 −0031 0228 −0270
0249 0205 0048 0292 0365
Housing 0357 −0679 −0014 0176 −0230
0175 0123 0016 0202 0186
Clothing −0115 −0134 −1266 0194 −0240
0044 0030 0070 0077 0081
Trans. & comm. 0159 −0155 0090 −2219 −0253
0127 0112 0051 0515 0215
Other goods −0044 −0070 0054 0316 −0594
0057 0036 0024 0135 0163
Compensated price elasticities
Food −0914 0259 0080 0424 0147
0271 0203 0039 0309 0306
Housing 0457 −0629 0026 0244 −0099
0138 0107 0034 0161 0333
Clothing 0251 0045 −1113 0471 0357
0055 0036 0102 0069 0172
Trans. & comm. 0720 0118 0327 −1826 0661
0174 0057 0134 0553 0416
Other goods 0027 −0035 0084 0370 −0449
0079 0053 0023 0126 0117
Note: Elasticities are evaluated at the data means. Standard errors are given in italics.
Table 7. Income and price elasticities.
This strategy enables the identification of the parameters of the mk function and
of resource sharing within a Pareto efficient family. The income scaling function
mk is analogous to the price scaling function introduced by Barten (1964) or the
income scaling function described in Lewbel (1985, Theorem 8). This function is
specified in a parsimonious fashion and the vector ψ includes relative prices of the
assignable goods as required by the theory (Menon et al. 2016) and distribution fac-
tors.
The estimations are carried out using the full maximum likelihood method. The
parameters of the omitted equation, other goods, are recovered from the constraints
imposed by demand theory (Banks et al. 1997, Browning et al. 2013). The log of to-
tal expenditure is likely to be endogenous because of measurement errors, due either
to infrequency of purchases or to recall errors. To adjust for the possibility of endo-
geneity of the log of total expenditure, we apply the control function method (Blundell
and Robin 1999) and regress the log of total expenditure against the exogenous explana-
tory variables of the demand system and the log of net disposable income acting as the
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instrument for total expenditure. The residual r of the auxiliary regression is then in-
cluded in the system of budget shares and, conditional on this residual, the log of total
expenditure is exogenous. Thus, the error term εi can be decomposed as εi = νir + υi,
where νi is a parameter to be estimated and υi is an error term. Testing whether νi is
significantly different from zero corresponds to testing the exogeneity of the log of total
expenditure.
Table 5 reports the estimated parameters for price, income, and distribution factors.
These are often statistically significant. The parameters νi associated with the control
variables are also significantly different from zero, with the exception of the housing
share, thus justifying the correction for the endogeneity of total expenditure. Two of
the three distribution factors are statistically significant. The income parameters are
differentiated by gender and provide information that allows the recovery of individual
welfare functions. Table 6 presents the demographic effects. They are also significantly
different from zero, documenting that demographic factors affect consumption behav-
ior.
Estimated compensated and uncompensated price elasticities along with the indi-
vidual income effects are consistent with consumer theory (Table 7). From these es-
timates, we recover the individual and household welfare functions given in (32) and
(33) incorporating demographic heterogeneity, and the associated measures of intra-
household inequality (37).
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